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ABSTRACT: Providing valid responses to a self-report survey requires cognitive effort. Sub-
jects engaging in insufficient effort responding (IER) are unwilling to take this effort. Com-
pared to psychologists, experimental philosophers so far seem to have paid less attention to 
IER. This paper is an attempt to begin to alleviate this shortcoming. First, I explain IER’s 
nature, prevalence and negative effects in self-report surveys in general. Second, I argue that 
IER might also affect experimental philosophy studies. Third, I develop recommendations as 
to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to prevent IER. Fourth, I devel-
op recommendations as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to de-
tect IER. Fifth, I sketch how experimental philosophers ought to proceed once a subject has 
been identified as an insufficient effort responder. And finally, I report the results of an online 
survey that addresses experimental philosophers’ current knowledge, consideration and as-
sessment of IER.  
KEY WORDS: experimental philosophy; insufficient effort responding; methodology; attention 
checks; MTurk 
 
In the last two decades analytic philosophy has seen the rise of a novel interdisciplinary ap-
proach going by the name of “experimental philosophy” (see Knobe and Nichols 2017). Ex-
perimental philosophers conduct scientific studies that are designed to test the empirical 
premises of arguments for philosophical conclusions.1 These studies haven taken different 
forms (see Rose and Danks 2013). In what follows I will focus on what has made up the bulk 
of the extant experimental philosophy research, namely studies that target ordinary people’s 
                                                 
1
 These conclusions can be either substantive (as in experimental philosophy’s “positive program”) or methodo-
logical (as in its “negative program,” which purports to undermine traditional philosophical methods such as the 
method of cases) (see Kauppinen 2007). In addition, many experimental philosophers have also used scientific 
data to illuminate human cognition and to reveal patterns of intuitions that require explanation (see Knobe 2016; 
Knobe and Nichols 2007) — a project that might be claimed to go beyond testing the empirical premises of 
arguments for philosophical conclusions. 
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intuitions about philosophical concepts (such as intentional action, free will, and knowledge). 
These studies share the following features: 
 
- Participants: ordinary people (in the sense of philosophical laypersons) 
- Hypotheses: hypotheses about the content, causes and underlying psychological 
mechanisms of these people’s intuitions about philosophical concepts 
- General Method: quantitative methods of the social sciences, in particular psychol-
ogy 
- Specific Method: self-report surveys: subjects are asked to respond to hypothetical 
scenarios by reporting their intuitions about them 
 
One thing that puzzled me when I first contributed to an experimental philosophy study in the 
above sense was how little cognitive effort many subjects seem to have taken in responding to 
it. For example, some subjects completed the study in less than half the time that would have 
been necessary to even only read all materials; and many failed very simple attention and 
comprehension checks. 
In the psychology literature the phenomenon that I encountered has recently mostly been 
referred to as “insufficient effort responding” (IER) (Huang et al. 2012).2 More and more psy-
chologists have come to regard this phenomenon as a threat to the validity and reliability of 
self-report surveys (e.g., Curran 2016; Huang et al. 2012, 2015; Meade and Craig 2012). Yet, 
in experimental philosophy IER so far seems to have received less attention. This paper is an 
attempt to begin to alleviate this shortcoming. My aim is to synthesize the current state of the 
art regarding IER; to infer preliminary and rough guidelines for experimental philosophers 
(including references for further investigation); and, most of all, to raise awareness for the 
issue.  
Here is how I will proceed. First, I will explain IER’s nature, prevalence and negative ef-
fects in self-report surveys in general. Second, I will argue that IER might also affect experi-
mental philosophy studies in particular. Third, I will develop recommendations as to how ex-
perimental philosophers should (and should not) try to prevent IER. Fourth, I will develop 
recommendations as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to detect 
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 Other common labels include “careless responding,” “satisficing,” “random responding,” “content-independent 
responding,” and “content-nonresponsitivity.” Note, however, that most of these labels denote somewhat nar-
rower or otherwise slightly different phenomena (see Huang et al. 2012, as well as Sec. 1).  
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IER. Fifth, I will sketch how experimental philosophers ought to proceed once a subject has 
been identified as an insufficient effort responder. And finally, I will report the results of an 
online survey that addresses experimental philosophers’ current knowledge, consideration and 
assessment of IER.  
1 Insufficient Effort Responding in Self-Report Surveys 
Providing valid responses to a self-report survey requires cognitive effort. Ideally, subjects 
would go through the following five steps (see Krosnick 1991; Tourangeau et al. 2010): (1) 
they read the survey’s instructions, questions, answer options or items; (2) they attempt to 
comprehend them, i.e., to grasp their intended meaning; (3) they compute and/or search their 
memory for relevant information; (4) they form judgements in response to the questions; and 
(5) they respond in ways that reflect these judgements. Unfortunately, subjects are not always 
willing to conform to this model. Sometimes they respond without having completed some or 
even any of its steps, even though they would have been able to do so.3 This is when IER oc-
curs.  
The label “insufficient effort responding” was introduced by Huang et al. (2012). In line 
with the understanding assumed here, they define the phenomenon exclusively by reference to 
its underlying cause, namely a lack of motivation to take sufficient cognitive effort (inde-
pendently of subjects’ response patterns, intentions, etc.):  
 
To provide a comprehensive depiction of the phenomenon of interest, we propose the label 
of insufficient effort responding (IER), defined as a response set in which the respondent 
answers a survey measure with low or little motivation to comply with the survey instruc-
tions, correctly interpret item content, and provide accurate responses. (Huang et al. 2012: 
100) 
 
In order for IER to be a potential problem for self-report surveys it must be both prevalent in 
these surveys and have negative effects. Recent psychological research suggests that both of 
these conditions might be met.  
 
                                                 
3
 To reemphasize, as it is understood here, IER only pertains to cases in which subjects were not willing to com-
plete all steps of the survey response model, and not to cases in which they were not able to do so. Poor quality 
responses that result from factors such as low cognitive abilities or insufficient grasp of the survey’s language 
hence do not qualify as IER.  
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1.1 Prevalence 
So far only few studies have attempted to determine the prevalence of IER in self-report sur-
veys. Given that some samples exhibit more IER than others, and that there are no established 
IER indicators and indicator thresholds (Hauser and Schwartz 2016; see also Sec. 4), it might 
not come as a surprise that these studies’ estimates vary considerably (see Table 1).  
 
Studies Minimum Average Maximum 
Kurtz and Parish 2001  10.6%  
Johnson 2005  3.5%  
Ehlers et al. 2009  5%  
Curran et al. 2010 5%  50% 
Meade and Craig 2012 10%  12% 
Maniaci and Rogge 2014 3%  9% 
Klein et al. 2014
4
 7%  47% 
Hauser and Schwarz 2016
5
 5%  61% 
  
Table 1: Some estimates of the proportion of IER subjects in self-report surveys 
Some earlier studies (Johnson 2005; Ehlers et al. 2009; Curran et al. 2010) used indicators 
that can only detect one form of IER, and only if it occurs over the course of a number of 
items. They thus likely underrepresented the proportion of IER subjects (for this argument see 
Meade and Craig 2012). Some later studies (Klein et al. 2014; Hauser and Schwarz 2015) 
implausibly considered failure in even only one attention check as sufficient for IER. I pro-
pose that the most well-grounded estimates therefore lie somewhere in between these ex-
tremes. It seems that on average around 10% of subjects in self-report surveys do not show 
sufficient effort over considerable parts of these surveys (Meade and Craig 2012).  
 
                                                 
4
 Klein et al.’s data was analyzed by Hauser and Schwarz (2016). 
5
 Hauser and Schwartz’s minimum and maximum values pertain to different samples, namely MTurkers and 
students, respectively. In other experiments they also found that MTurkers fared better in terms of IER (4% vs. 
74% on a novel attention check, and 74.5% vs. 87.8% on a structurally unusual attention check). For IER-related 
differences between crowdsourcing and student samples see also Sec. 3.1. 
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1.2 Effects 
Researchers widely agree that when IER occurs at the rate reported above it can have serious 
psychometric effects (Huang et al. 2012, 2015; Curran et al. 2015; Leiner 2016; Liu et al. 
2013).  
For a long time it has been assumed that IER always or almost always results in random 
responding, i.e., in patterns which are not sensitive to the survey’s content or form in any way 
(e.g., Beach 1989; Charter 1994; Curran et al. 2010; Johnson 2005). To the extent to which it 
takes this form IER can attenuate correlations, and hence increase the likelihood of Type II 
errors; i.e., effects that would have been significant if subjects had taken sufficient effort may 
be found to be not significant (e.g., Clark et al. 2003; McGrath et al. 2010). Moreover, ran-
dom responding can also lower reliability estimates and cause errors in scale development and 
factor analysis (e.g., Johnson 2005; Meade and Craig 2012; Woods 2006). 
To provide a concrete example, in an article entitled “Random responding from partici-
pants is a threat to the validity of social science research results” Osborn and Blanchard 
(2011) report a study on the effectiveness of two educational interventions. In the pre- and 
post-intervention parts of this study 40.0% and 29.5% of students were found to engage in 
random responding, respectively. With these students included in their analysis, Osborn and 
Blanchard did not find any significant difference in the extent to which the two educational 
interventions influenced students’ test scores. But once the insufficient effort responders were 
removed, the effect reached the level of statistical significance (p < 0.0001), and its size in-
creased by no less than 42%. That is, only addressing IER allowed Osborn and Blanchard to 
detect the substantial benefits of one method of instruction over the other.   
In addition, it is important to stress that IER may not always result in random response 
patterns. Subjects who fail to complete all steps of the response model introduced above may 
sometimes rather choose the first answer option that seems reasonable to them (without con-
sidering the others); answer in the same way several times in a row; form answer patterns like 
straight lines, diagonal lines or zigzags; pick the “don’t know” option even though they have 
an intuition about the matter at hand; and so on. IER of this kind cannot only attenuate, but 
also inflate correlations. In other words, it can lead researchers to reject the null hypothesis 
even though it is true (Type I error) (Huang et al. 2013, 2015; Woods 2006). 
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2 Insufficient Effort Responding in Experimental Philosophy 
Our above considerations suggest that under certain circumstances IER can be a problem for 
self-report surveys. But is it also a potential problem for experimental philosophy studies in 
particular? 
So far the prevalence and effects of IER have mainly been investigated with regard to 
studies in personality psychology.6 It might be argued that these results do not generalize to 
experimental philosophy, either because experimental philosophy studies are relevantly dif-
ferent from personality psychology studies or for statistical reasons. In what follows I will 
argue that both of these arguments are weak. Then I will present some positive anecdotal evi-
dence for the hypothesis that IER is also a potential problem for experimental philosophy 
studies.  
 
2.1 The Relevant Differences Objection 
Previous research has suggested that IER increases with a survey’s length (e.g., Meade and 
Craig 2012; see also Sec. 3.3) and complicatedness (Gage et al. 1957). According to the most 
plausible version of the first objection, experimental philosophy studies tend to involve less 
IER than personality psychology studies because they are shorter and simpler.  
Proponents of this objection are right that the average experimental philosophy study is 
short; shorter than the average personality psychology study.7 But this only means that, all 
other things being equal, these studies are somewhat less prone to IER. It does not by itself 
imply that serious psychometric effects cannot occur (see Sec. 2.3). After all, in addition to 
survey length, IER is also sensitive to various other factors, such as the formulation of survey 
materials, personality traits, complicatedness, etc. (e.g., Bowling et al. 2016; Gage et al. 
1957). Moreover, not all experimental philosophy studies are short. To provide an example 
from my own research, the study that I mentioned in the introduction to this paper took sub-
jects on average around 50 minutes to complete (Pölzler and Wright 2020b; see also, e.g., 
Wagner et al. under review; Wright et al. 2013, 2014; Wright 2018).  
                                                 
6
 For example, many early studies focused on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, and in recent 
years many researchers have used items from the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. 
7
 Think again of classic experimental philosophy studies like Knobe 2003 on intentional action, in which sub-
jects are only presented one single vignette, and only asked two questions about this vignette. In contrast, the 
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa and McCrae 1992) requires that subjects rate 60 distinct items.  
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The above objection’s second sub-claim — that experimental philosophy studies are also 
generally simpler than personality psychology studies — strikes me as wrong in the first 
place. IER has often been tested based on the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa and 
McCrae 1992). In such studies subjects are asked to indicate their level of agreement with 
items such as “I am a productive person who always gets the job done,” or “I am sometimes 
completely absorbed in music I am listening to” (Costa and McCrae 1992). Many materials in 
experimental philosophy studies are equally or more difficult to process than this personality 
psychology research. Think, for example, of two of the most famous studies, in which sub-
jects had to decide whether Gettier cases (cases in which a person has a justified true belief 
but their justification is false) qualify as knowledge (Weinberg et al. 2001), and whether an 
action’s good/bad side-effects qualify as intentional (Knobe 2003).  
 
2.2 The Statistical Objection 
A second potential reason for assuming a low prevalence of IER in experimental philosophy 
(compared to personality psychology) is statistical. Psychologists recently had to confront the 
worrisome fact that only 36.1% of a selection of 100 studies could be replicated, with person-
ality psychology ranging below average (Open Science Collaboration 2015). In contrast, the 
XPhi-replicability project’s recent attempt to replicate 40 experimental philosophy studies 
resulted in a replication rate of about 70% (Cova et al. 2018). Doesn’t this suggest that exper-
imental philosophy is less affected by IER than personality psychology? 
I take it that such an inference would be hasty. A first thing to note is that IER is most of-
ten problematic in that it attenuates effects. It prevents them from being detected as statistical-
ly significant (Sec 1.2). This means that those studies that are most often and most strongly 
affected by IER are studies with null effects, i.e., studies that fail to yield statistically signifi-
cant effects. But both the Open Science Collaboration and the XPhi-replicability project did 
not test many studies of this kind. For example, only three of the tested experimental philoso-
phy studies showed null effects (Cova et al. 2018). We therefore still lack sufficient data 
about the replicability of those studies that were most likely and most strongly to be affected 
by IER, and therefore cannot draw reliable conclusions about differing IER proportions from 
those replication attempts that have so far been made.8   
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 To restate and further clarify my above argument, I acknowledge that IER may have contributed to some repli-
cation failures (in psychology, experimental philosophy and elsewhere) in minor ways. However, since these 
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Moreover, none of the most common explanations for experimental philosophy’s high 
replication rate cites a comparably lower level of IER either. Consider the XPhi-replicability 
project’s proposed explanations (Cova et al. 2018). According to this project, experimental 
philosophy studies were more likely to replicate because they (1) showed larger effect sizes 
than psychology studies; (2) are typically survey-based and less costly (which means that they 
often involve larger samples, have more subjects in each condition, and can be more easily re-
run and replicated); (3) mostly study how the content of certain stimuli (hypothetical scenari-
os) affects subjects’ behavior (as opposed to contextual or demographic variables); and (4) are 
run by researchers who are more prone to thinking about methodological issues. 
 
2.3 Anecdotal Evidence 
Recent studies suggest that an IER subjects proportion of only 5% may suffice to attenuate or 
inflate correlations (Huang et al. 2012, 2015). So even if IER’s prevalence in experimental 
philosophy were lower than in personality psychology (as claimed by the relevant difference 
and the statistical objections discussed above) this would still not rule out negative psycho-
metric effects. However, to further substantiate that experimental philosophy actually likely 
involves a comparably high IER rate let me also present some positive anecdotal evidence.  
In the introduction I have already touched upon IER results from my own experimental 
philosophy research. Here I would also like to mention a recent study that seems particularly 
unlikely to provoke IER, because it was very short (average completion time: 5.3 minutes) 
and simple (subjects were asked to select whether they agree/disagree/neither agree nor disa-
gree with moral sentences or whether they take these sentences to be true/false/neither true 
nor false) (Pölzler and Wright 2020a).9 In this study 17.92% failed an attention check that 
required them to pick the farthest left of five horizontally lined fields; 8.65% failed an atten-
tion check that required them to pick any of five horizontally lined fields that is not farthest to 
the left; 11.54% failed an attention check that required them to memorize an important part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
failures where mostly found in non-null effect studies, and since IER mainly affects null effect studies, a number 
of other factors plausibly contributed in much stronger ways. Only once null effects get published more frequent-
ly, and are attempted to be replicated more frequently, IER can become a more powerful explanation of replica-
tion failures, and replication rate differences across disciplines may be partly traced back to differing rates of 
IER.  
9
 As the study’s results were not helpful in testing the targeted hypothesis, the study is only described in a foot-
note of this paper (Section „Moral Truth“).  
 9 
 
a sentence that they had been asked to rate on the previous page; and 48.22% finished at a 
pace that probably did not allow them to read through all materials carefully.  
Following the 2018 Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference, some participants 
were willing to share IER-related data from some of their most recent experimental philoso-
phy research with me as well. In studying stakes effects on knowledge Francis et al. (forth-
coming) found that around 10% of their subjects failed at least one of two comprehension 
checks10, and that around 4% of their responses probably originated from virtual private server 
farms or bots11. Park et al. (forthcoming) found that 13.41% of their lay subjects answered an 
open-ended question in a way that suggested a lack of competence. And in Roberts et al. 
(2018) 18.04% of subjects failed at least one of two simple comprehension checks about the 
content of scenarios.  
 
In sum, the above considerations support that just as with personality psychology, IER is a 
potential problem for experimental philosophy studies as well. Researchers in this area should 
thus address IER. 
 
3 Preventing Insufficient Effort Responding (in Experimental 
Philosophy) 
One way of addressing IER is to detect and thereafter deal with it, for example by excluding 
subjects from analysis. This strategy has inevitable methodological downsides that will be 
discussed below (Sec. 5). It is thus advisable to try to prevent as much IER as possible before 
it even occurs (Ward and Pond 2015; Ward and Meade 2018). 
In what follows I will introduce the most common measures that psychologists have so 
far taken or suggested to prevent IER: (1) choosing particular kinds of samples, (2) sufficient-
ly compensating subjects, (3) shortening surveys, (4) simplifying surveys, (5) having proctors 
that oversee the completion of a survey, (6) including CAPTCHAS into online surveys, and 
(7) formulating instructions in certain kinds of ways. I will assess these measures’ effective-
                                                 
10
 Experiment 1: 13.39%, Experiment 2: 6.84%, Experiment 3: 10%, Experiment 4: 7.96%. 
11
 Experiment 1: 6.67%, Experiment 2: 2.50%, Experiment 3: 0.08%, Experiment 4: 5.83%. 
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ness and provide some thoughts as to whether and how they may be useful in experimental 
philosophy studies in particular. 
 
3.1 Sample 
In recent years both psychologists and experimental philosophers have increasingly drawn on 
crowdsourcing samples, such as from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Some researchers have ar-
gued that these samples are more prone to IER than traditional student samples — say, be-
cause subjects from crowdsourcing samples often participate for exclusively or mainly finan-
cial reasons (Goodman et al. 2013). The available evidence does not support this hypothesis. 
Almost all relevant studies suggest that crowdsourcing subjects are not more, and probably 
even less, likely to engage in IER than students (see Hauser and Schwarz 2016; Klein et al. 
2014; Paolacci et al. 2010).12
,13 Thus, IER-related considerations do not tell against experi-
mental philosophers using crowdsourcing samples. If anything they support this practice.14 
 
3.2 Compensation 
It is natural to assume that if a subject feels that he or she receives too little money, research 
credits, etc. for participating in a study then this subject is more likely to show insufficient 
effort. A second way in which one might try to prevent IER is thus by increasing subjects’ 
compensation. In self-report surveys this strategy again does not seem to improve data quality 
to any noteworthy extent (e.g., Burhmester et al. 2011; Horne et al. 2013; Meade and Warde 
2018).15 However, there is some evidence that the effectiveness of increased compensation is 
a function of subjects’ economic or cultural situation. In particular, MTurkers from India 
showed considerably less IER upon better payment (Litman et al. 2015). This fact should be 
kept in mind by experimental philosophers doing cross-cultural research (which has recently 
become more common; see, e.g., Machery et al. 2017; Rose et al. forthcoming). Apart from 
                                                 
12
 The only study that suggests that students perform better than crowdsourcing participants (Goodman et al. 
2013) is methodologically flawed (as its MTurk sample included many non-native English speakers, see Hauser 
and Schwarz 2016). 
13
 Within Amazon Mechanical Turk workers are assigned rates that reflect the proportion of their HITS (human 
intelligence tasks) that were approved. There is evidence that requiring an approval rate of at least 95% decreas-
es IER (Peer et al. 2014). 
14
 To reemphasize, this section only addresses the extent to which the particular phenomenon of IER is a prob-
lem for crowdsourcing samples. It does not purport to account for other potential advantages or disadvantages of 
these samples, such as ethical concerns regarding compensation or representativeness of the general population. 
15
 In contrast, there is some evidence that increasing compensation reduces IER in studies whose tasks have 
objectively correct answers (Aker et al. 2012). 
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that, the above findings suggest that increasing payment is not an effective strategy for pre-
venting IER.16  
 
3.3 Proctors 
Today most experimental philosophy studies are conducted online. Some researchers worry 
that in this unsupervised setting subjects are more likely to engage in IER than in the presence 
of a proctor (say, because they do not feel sufficiently accountable or more easily give in to 
distractions) (Johnson 2005; Meade and Craig 2012). This worry appears to be ungrounded 
too. Several studies suggest that the physical presence of a proctor at best only minimally de-
creases IER, if at all (see Curran 2016; Francavilla et al. forthcoming; Klein 2014). The same 
holds true for “virtual proctors” as well: stylized human beings that are shown in the left mar-
gin of the computer screen throughout online surveys (Francavilla et al. forthcoming; Ward 
and Pond 2015).17  
 
3.4 Survey Length 
As mentioned in Sec. 2.1, IER has been found to be to some extent determined by the length 
of surveys. In personality psychology studies (which tend to be long) it occurs more often in 
the middle or towards the end. For instance, Meade and Craig (2012) report that while at the 
beginning of their study less than 5% failed attention checks, towards the end this proportion 
increased to 25%. Responses also became continuously more alike over time, in the sense that 
subjects were more likely to choose the same answer option several times in a row (see also, 
e.g., Baer et al. 1997; Berry et al. 1991).  
The above findings suggest that one way of decreasing IER in experimental philosophy 
studies is to shorten them; for example, by using between-subject designs or limiting the 
number of tasks or items. However, this strategy must of course be balanced against counter-
vailing considerations. Many studies can only be valid or reach a sufficient degree of statisti-
cal power if they involve a within-subjects design or a high number of tasks and items (such 
as with the study that I mentioned in the introduction). Moreover, the available evidence only 
                                                 
16
 Needless to say, there are strong moral reasons to compensate subjects fairly, e.g., to pay them at least their 
country’s minimum wage. 
17
 On an IER-unrelated note, experimental philosophers might also want to decide against having proctors be-
cause they might influence subjects’ responses, especially if a survey is about personal or moral issues.   
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suggests that shortening long studies decreases IER; it has not yet addressed studies that are 
short (or rather short) from the beginning.  
 
3.5 Complicatedness 
Another feature that may increase self-report surveys’ propensity to IER (also mentioned in 
Sec. 2.1) is their being complicated, i.e., difficult to understand (Gage et al. 1957). The empir-
ical evidence for this effect is scarce. From a theoretical perspective, however, it almost seems 
like a truism. The more complicated a task or item the more cognitive effort it takes to read it, 
comprehend it, relate it to relevant memories, form a judgement about it, and respond to it in a 
way that reflects this judgement. All other things being equal, subjects are therefore less likely 
to complete all of these steps with regard to complicated than with regard to simple tasks and 
items. 
Some experimental philosophy studies are quite complicated, such as the studies about 
Gettier cases and intentional actions mentioned above.18 In these cases simplifying tasks and 
items may help to decrease IER. For example, one might substitute less by more familiar 
words (as indicated by word familiarity databases) and complex for simpler words (with the 
help of synonyms dictionaries), shorten sentences, structure questions in the most comprehen-
sible way, introduce additional paragraph breaks, and highlight important terms. Analogously 
to the shortening recommendation, however, experimental philosophers of course should not 
sacrifice reliability or validity in employing this strategy (sometimes there just is no simple/r 
way of testing what one means to test); and simplifying materials that are already quite simple 
may not have any effect at all.  
 
3.6 CAPTCHAs 
The least effortful way of completing an online survey is by running a dedicated bot, i.e., a 
program that answers questions automatically.19 In recent months more and more researchers 
                                                 
18
 Parts of my own research on folk moral objectivity are even more complicated. For example, in one task sub-
jects were asked to choose among descriptions of moral realism and variants of anti-realism, such as “When a 
person says that something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, etc. she intends to state a fact. Such facts 
exist – and they are independent from what anybody thinks about them. For example, an action that is morally 
wrong is wrong no matter what anyone thinks. So it would still be wrong even if you yourself, or the majority of 
the members of your culture, thought that it is not morally wrong” (Pölzler and Wright 2020b). 
19
 On the definition given in Sec. 1, running a bot qualifies as an instance of IER because those who engage in 
this behavior are unmotivated to complete any of the survey response model’s steps. But even if one rejects this 
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have reported results and paradata which suggest the increased presence of such programs on 
MTurk (Stokel-Walker 2018). A simple and effective way of preventing some of this worst 
form of IER is by including a CAPTCHA (“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart”) at the beginning of one’s survey — for example, to have 
subjects report letters that can be seen in a blurred image or to have them identify the location 
of certain objects in a picture. On many survey platforms prebuilt CAPTCHAs can be imple-
mented within seconds. This measure of preventing IER is thus highly advisable for any ex-
perimental philosophy study (and indeed any survey using online crowdsourcing samples).  
 
3.7 Instructions 
A final way in which one might try to prevent IER is by including certain information in 
one’s survey’s instructions. Studies suggest that neither introducing the researchers and their 
expertise nor informing subjects that they will receive feedback about the quality and usage of 
their responses has any effect (Ward and Meade 2018).20 Two other kinds of instruction-based 
measures, in contrast, are to be recommended.21 First, experimental philosophers might appeal 
to subjects’ conscience. Ward and Meade (2018) found less IER when they briefly informed 
subjects about the amount of work that goes into designing and conducting a study, had them 
type their initials next to six requirements (such as about the study’s length), and finally asked 
them to type their name next to the statement “I promise to carefully read each item and to 
provide an honest response” (Ward and Meade 2018: 14-15).22 Second, it may also prove ef-
fective to increase subjects’ perception of meaningfulness; for example, by explaining the 
study’s purpose and significance (even if only in vague and general terms), and thanking sub-
jects for their participation (see Chandler and Kapelner 2013).23 
                                                                                                                                                        
classification, the issue is definitely related to IER, and is so important that it certainly warrants being men-
tioned. 
20
 To be precise, these measures did not have any effect on objective IER measures. They did influence subjects’ 
IER self-reports. 
21
 There is another instruction-based measure that proved effective in deterring IER. Subjects had to provide ten 
reasons for sufficient effort responding and declare when did not respond with sufficient effort to a survey in the 
last year they. This measure seem impracticably long and effortful to me.  
22
 Having subjects provide their names undermines the (perceived) anonymity of their responses. Hence, to me it 
seems preferable to have them type the above statement into a box, without revealing their name. 
23
 Note that Chandler and Kapelner found an effect of increasing perceptions of meaningfulness in studies that 
have objectively right answers. It is not yet clear whether this effect generalizes to self-report surveys. 
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4 Detecting Insufficient Effort Responding (in Experimental 
Philosophy) 
Even with the best prevention measures in place some IER is bound to happen. Experimental 
philosophers should thus also use strategies to identify such responses (so that they can deal 
with them). Seven indicators have so far been particularly common in self-report surveys: (1) 
attention checks, (2) response time measures, (3) comprehension checks, (4) self-reports on 
survey effort, (5) response pattern analyses, (6) response consistency analyses, (7) the identi-
fication of atypical responses, and (8) open-ended questions. In what follows I will introduce 
these indicators, assess their effectiveness, and provide some thoughts as to whether and how 
they may be useful in experimental philosophy studies in particular. Before that, however, 
three general remarks are in order. 
First, each of the indicators that will be discussed below can only detect specific forms of 
IER. Experimental philosophers are thus well-advised to use more than one of them (Berinsky 
et al. 2013; Curran 2016; Meade and Craig 2012; Thomas and Clifford 2017). Second, differ-
ent indicators suit different kinds of studies (depending on their length, usage or number of 
items, etc.) (DeSimone et al. 2014). And third, each of the indicators requires stipulating a 
threshold that distinguishes sufficient from insufficient effort. At the moment there are no 
established values for these thresholds. As research about IER indicators’ effectiveness and 
potential unwanted effects is still at its beginning, and as one should also combine several of 
these indicators, I will here assume a conservative approach. That is, I will recommend low 
individual thresholds that flag only the worst IER subjects, as measured by each individual 
indicator (see Curran 2016; Leiner 2016). Note, however, that in the end the question of 
where to set these thresholds also depends on assumptions about the kind of intuitions that are 
relevant for philosophy. For example, if one believes that only intuitions that have resulted 
from thorough reflection can be philosophically relevant (e.g., Kauppinen 2007), one should 
set stricter IER limits than if one targets more immediate intuitions.  
 
4.1 Attention Checks 
The most well-known and common method for detecting IER are attention checks. These 
checks have typically taken four distinct forms: (1) instructional manipulation checks, (2) 
instructed-response items, (3) bogus/infrequency items, and (4) stand-alone checks. 
 
Instructional Manipulation Checks 
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Instructional Manipulation Checks (Oppenheimer et al. 2009) measure the extent to which 
subjects attend to a task’s instructions. A statement embedded in these instructions asks sub-
jects to proceed in an unusual way. For example, it requires clicking on the page title to be 
forwarded to the next page or writing a predefined text in a box entitled “other”: 
 
[…] in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the […] items 
below, as well as the continue button. Instead, simply click on the title at the top of this 
screen […] to proceed to the next screen. (Oppenheimer et al. 2009: 868) 
If you are reading these instructions please write “I read the instructions” in the “other” box. 
(Pennycook et al. 2014: 6) 
 
Instructed-Response Items  
Instructed-Response Items (e.g., Gummer et al. forthcoming; Kam and Chan 2018) measure 
subjects’ attention to a task’s items. At first sight they look like regular items. However, sub-
jects are asked to provide specific predefined responses to them. Here are again two exam-
ples:  
 
Please choose strongly disagree for this item (Kam and Chan 2018: 83)  
click strongly agree (Gummer et al. forthcoming: 2) 
 
Bogus/Infrequency Items 
Another common way of testing subjects’ attention to item content is to include items that 
most people would regard as absurd or highly probable/improbable (e.g., Beach 1989; Huang 
et al. 2014). Here are some examples of such “bogus” or “infrequency” items (with the first 
not to be recommended for reasons specified below):  
 
I work twenty-eight hours in a typical work day. (Huang et al. 2014) 
I was born on February 30
th
. (Beach 1989)  
I have never used a computer. (Breitsohl and Steidelmüller 2018: 291) 
 
Stand-Alone Checks 
In some experimental philosophy studies instructions are too short for instructional manipula-
tion checks to work. The studies also may not ask subjects to rate various items in close suc-
cession. In these cases stand-alone attention checks (that make up a separate survey page or 
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task) may be more suitable. For example, as reported above, subjects could be presented five 
fields and asked:  
 
Please pick the response farthest to the left. (Pölzler and Wright 2020b) 
 
General Discussion 
In formulating any of the above attention checks several recommendations should be kept in 
mind. First, subjects may over time become familiar with standardized versions of these 
checks. Their effectiveness in detecting IER can therefore be increased by introducing novel 
content or structures (Thomas and Clifford 2017). Second, attention checks’ required re-
sponses should vary within studies (e.g., not always “strongly disagree”, or the farthest left 
response), so that they are more likely to detect IER subjects who continuously provide the 
same response (Desimone et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2014; Meade and Craig 2012). Third, there 
must not be plausible alternative readings of the attention checks that justify differing re-
sponses (such as, e.g., with the purported bogus sentence “I work twenty-eight hours in a typ-
ical work day” which might be read as expressing, in a hyperbolic way, that one is hard-
working, see Breitsohl and Steidelmüller 2018). And fourth, all checks should be formulated 
in ways that minimize unwanted effects, such as emotions, amusement or answers based on 
social desirability (for this problem see again the above bogus sentence about a twenty-eight 
hours work day).  
How many attention checks may a subject fail before he or she is classified as having en-
gaged in IER? Nobody can pay full attention all of the time. Flagging subjects for failing just 
one check therefore seems too rigid (at least if the checks aren’t extremely simple) (Berinsky 
et al. 2013; Thomas and Clifford 2017; Paolacci et al. 2010). Curran (2016) suggests inferring 
IER from failure in more than 50% of a study’s attention checks. This, on the other hand, 
seems too liberal (at least if the checks aren’t extremely difficult). A subject who fails as 
many checks as that likely does not show sufficient effort. In my view, for most kinds of at-
tention checks, appropriate thresholds will lie somewhere in between these values; such as, 
for example, at a failure rate of 25%.24 
                                                 
24
 As indicated above, in setting their threshold researchers should also account for their attention checks’ rela-
tive difficulty. For example, Instructional Manipulation Checks are generally more difficult to pass than other 
kinds of attention checks (as they are harder to get right by accident). 
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Attention checks have been found to be effective in detecting IER (e.g., Breitsohl and 
Steidelmüller 2018; Gummer et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2012; Leiner 2016). If properly done 
such checks also do not affect subsequent response behavior (e.g., Breitsohl and Steidelmüller 
2018; Huang et al. 2015; Oppenheimer 2009).25 Negative effects are especially unlikely if the 
survey instructions explicitly mention that there will be an assessment of subjects’ carefulness 
(Breitsohl and Steidelmüller 2018). I therefore recommend that experimental philosophers 
make use of properly designed attention checks in their studies.  
 
4.2 Response Time 
A second common way of detecting IER is based on subjects’ completion times (of the 
survey as a whole, individual pages or individual items).26 If a subject answers very fast then 
he or she probably did not go through all stages of the idealized response process, as intro-
duced in Sec. 1. Specifying what is too fast is challenging. Matjasic et al. (2018) helpfully 
distinguish two approaches: the statistical and the cognitive. Here I will discuss these ap-
proaches by the example of survey — as opposed to page or item — completion times (as 
survey completion times have been most commonly appealed to). (Note, however, that sub-
jects sometimes enter a survey before they actually complete it (to enable participation) or 
take breaks during completion (to surf the internet, eat, etc.). These outliers at the level of 
individual pages must be substituted by alternative values, e.g., the page’s median completion 
time (Leiner 2016).)The statistical approach determines completion time thresholds by con-
sidering the statistical properties of a survey’s response times. For example, researchers have 
assumed that IER occurs when a subject’s completion time is two standard deviations below 
the survey’s mean completion time (e.g., Heerwegh 2003), is lower than the first quartile mi-
nus 1.5 interquartile ranges (e.g., Funke et al. 2011), is lower than the first percentile (e.g., 
Gummer and Roßmann 2015), or is lower than the fifth percentile (e.g., Harms et al. 2017) 
(for an overview see Matjasic et al. 2018).  
The cognitive approach, in contrast, appeals to psychological properties. Huang et al. 
(2012) suggest that subjects cannot sufficiently process individual items in less than 2 sec-
onds. This threshold has been taken up by several other researchers. However, it seems 
                                                 
25
 Neither do they make subjects feel tricked or insulted, nor do they reduce their reliance on conversational 
norms or instill a more deliberative mind-set. 
26
 Most survey tools (such as Qualtrics) automatically measure survey completion times. To also measure page 
or item completion times, respective measures need to be manually implemented. 
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somewhat arbitrary; the average length of items varies considerably across studies; and many 
studies (especially in experimental philosophy) are not item-based at all. More appropriate 
and helpful specifications therefore rather appeal to general reading speed. For example, one 
may draw on Taylor’s (1965) classic study of US students, according to which the average 
reading time per minute is 300 words, and set an IER threshold at half (150 words/minute) or 
two thirds (200 words/minute) of this value.  
So far the statistical approach to setting completion time thresholds has been more com-
mon than the cognitive one. Under some circumstances (such as when subjects receive differ-
ing numbers of tasks) it is indeed more feasible or appropriate. In the majority of cases, how-
ever, the cognitive approach seems preferable. Response time indicators are motivated by the 
idea that completing a survey faster than at a certain speed just cannot be done without engag-
ing in IER. This is the idea of an absolute threshold. While this threshold may be difficult to 
determine, the statistical approach involves the danger of having a slow sample, and thus 
flagging subjects who actually took enough time; as well as of having a fast sample, and thus 
failing to flag subjects who went too fast.  
In any case, response time indicators have been found to be highly effective in detecting 
IER (Leiner 2016; Zhang and Conrad 2014). They are also invisible to subjects, and hence 
cannot possibly affect their responses in any way. I therefore strongly advise experimental 
philosophers to make use of these indicators.  
 
4.3 Comprehension Checks 
A third possible way of testing for IER are comprehension checks. Comprehension checks 
measure whether subjects have fully grasped the meaning of certain study materials or rele-
vant concepts or claims. Failure to do so can have two distinct sources: (1) the subjects did 
not take sufficient effort, or (2) even though they took sufficient effort, they were not able to 
grasp the relevant meanings.  
The above distinction suggests that comprehension checks are not pure IER indicators, in 
the sense of measuring only IER. This need not be regarded as a problem. First, the simpler 
comprehension checks are the more likely they capture IER rather than cognitive inability. 
One can thus render them almost pure. And second, for some experimental philosophy studies 
measuring cognitive ability is independently worthwhile. These studies’ manipulations only 
work if subjects have a very good grasp of the meaning of certain materials. Moreover, it has 
been argued that for experimental research to potentially have implications for philosophy, 
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subjects need to be competent with regard to the concepts at issue anyhow (see Kauppinen 
2007; Pölzler 2018)27.  
On the other hand, there are also experimental philosophy studies whose ambition is 
more empirical, e.g., to determine why people have certain kinds of philosophical intuitions. 
In these cases the results of comprehension checks may have to be utilized and interpreted in 
somewhat different ways. After all, it could be that the reason why people have certain intui-
tions is precisely that they lack in comprehension, either in the sense of being unwilling or 
unable to grasp certain philosophical propositions. By discarding comprehension check fail-
ures as IER straight away researchers could thus rob themselves of the possibility of gaining 
important insights into folk philosophical cognition. For an example of a comprehension 
check, consider again the folk metaethics study mentioned in the introduction (Pölzler and 
Wright 2020b). After having explained the difference between normative and metaethical 
sentences, we asked subjects a theoretical question that tested their understanding of this dis-
tinction, and had them classify a number of sentences as either normative ethical or metaethi-
cal. Subjects who failed in any of these checks were shown the instructions again, and had to 
complete the task for a second time. High failure rates at this second attempt were then treated 
as pro tanto evidence for IER. 
So far comprehension checks have not received any attention in the general IER litera-
ture. There is thus no data about their effectiveness, compared to other indicators. Yet, from a 
theoretical perspective such checks again seem to be recommendable to experimental philos-
ophers, adjusted to the aims of their respective studies; especially on the basis of conservative 
thresholds (e.g., IER equals failure in more than 25% of these checks). 
 
4.4 Self-Reports 
The most straightforward way of testing for IER is to simply ask subjects whether they en-
gaged in it. For example, Meade and Craig (2012) ended their survey with a self-report scale 
involving items such as “I put forth _____ effort towards this study,” “I gave this study ____ 
attention” (five response options), as well as with the question “In your honest opinion, 
should we use your data in our analyses in this study?” This measure did not turn out to be 
helpful. Answers to Meade and Craig’s questions correlated only to a negligibly low degree 
                                                 
27
 Kauppinen of course argues that quantitative research cannot ensure that subjects have sufficient conceptual 
competence. 
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with the results of more objective IER indicators, such as attention checks or response time 
measures.28  
 
4.5 Response Patterns 
Sometimes IER manifests in patterned responses. The most common case (more common, 
e.g., than diagonal lines or zigzags) is when subjects give the same answer several times in a 
row. To detect such “straightliners” researchers have so far mainly used two measures: (1) 
LongString Analysis and (2) Scale Straightlining Analysis.  
 
LongString Analysis 
LongString Analysis (e.g., Johnson 2005) determines the longest sequence of identical re-
sponses by a subject. If this value exceeds a certain threshold the subject is classified as an 
IER responder. The threshold’s most appropriate location depends both on the survey’s length 
and content. Following Curran (2016), for example, one may flag subjects who give consecu-
tive identical responses over half or more than half of a scale (or survey).  
 
Scale Straightlining Analysis 
Scale Straightlining Analysis (see Leiner 2016) counts the number of completely straightlined 
scales (or tables). Again, if this number is above a certain threshold the subject is classified as 
an IER responder. And again, the appropriate value of this threshold depends on the survey’s 
length (in particular, the number of scales) and content. 
 
Straightlining is particularly likely to occur with matrix tables (which allow subjects to rate 
multiple items in response to one question). In the absence of countervailing reasons such 
tables are thus to be avoided (Vannette 2016). But even in non-matrix settings LongString 
Analysis and Scale Straightlining Analysis may be effective ways of detecting IER (Leiner 
2016; Meade and Craig 2012). While they may not be applicable to typical short experimental 
philosophy studies (as these studies only involve few questions, tables, scales or items), long-
er studies may be assessed in terms of these indicators. A helpful Excel macro for calculating 
LongString can be found at Landers 2016. 
                                                 
28
 One might argue that given special features of typical experimental philosophy studies (such as high concep-
tual complexity) self-reports function as a reliable IER indicator for at least those studies. This is an interesting 
empirical hypothesis that could be taken up by future IER research. 
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4.6 Response Consistency  
During a survey subjects’ intuitions normally do not considerably change. If they provide 
different responses to questions or items with the same or similar content this may therefore 
be taken as another indicator for IER. Response consistency has so far mainly been measured 
in four ways: (1) identical responses, (2) odd-even consistency, (3) psychometric consistency, 
and (4) semantic consistency. 
 
Identical Responses 
The simplest way of testing for consistency is to provide subjects with the same question or 
item several times (Buechley and Ball 1952). If their responses differ (considerably) this may 
be due to IER.  
 
Odd-Even Consistency 
In the odd-even consistency test (e.g., Huang et al. 2012, 2014; Johnson 2005) items on uni-
dimensional scales are divided into odd (item 1, item 3, etc.) and even (item 2, item 4, etc.). 
For each subject the researchers then calculate the extent to which their odd and even re-
sponses correlate. If the value is low this indicates low individual reliability, and hence poten-
tial IER.  
 
Psychometric Consistency 
Psychometric consistency tests (Johnson 2005) identify those item or response pairs that cor-
related most strongly across the whole sample. Then they investigate how these items are cor-
related within subjects. If the within-subject correlation strays too far from the sample correla-
tion this is again taken to indicate IER.  
 
Semantic Consistency 
To run semantic consistency tests (e.g., Goldberg and Kilkowski 1985) some of a study’s 
questions, answers or items must be formulated in terms of semantic synonyms or antonyms. 
For example, after asking whether a person in a hypothetical scenario is “happy”, one may 
present subjects with the same scenario at a later point, asking them whether the person is 
“joyful”. If subjects’ responses fail to be sufficiently correlated they are flagged for IER.  
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Evidence on the above strategies for detecting IER is scarce. Odd-even consistency (see 
Leiner 2016), semantic consistency (see Kurtz and Parrish 2001), and psychometric con-
sistency (see Meade and Craig 2012) may not be particularly effective in detecting IER. 
Moreover, many experimental philosophy studies are not structured in a way that allows for 
odd-even tests; and semantic consistency tests seem ill-suited for these studies in that re-
searchers typically target intuitions about specific concepts (e.g., happiness as opposed to joy-
fulness), and wording matters much. These tests are hence not be recommended. However, 
experimental philosophers may occasionally provide fully identical content, as in this case 
differing responses are a more reliable IER indicator.  
 
 
4.7 Atypical Responses 
IER is also a potential cause of subjects providing extreme (statistically unlikely) responses. 
Various statistics allow measuring how far a subject’s responses stray from the sample mean 
across all of a survey’s items (e.g., Mahalanobis 1936). Values that exceed a certain threshold 
(e.g., p=.05, p=.01, or p=.001, Meade and Craig 2012) have sometimes been taken to indicate 
IER. However, the effectiveness of this indicator is again unclear (see Meade and Craig 2012 
versus Leiner 2016). Some statistics also require much power and presuppose a data distribu-
tion approximating normality (Meade and Craig 2012). Finally, especially in experimental 
philosophy studies some subjects simply may hold extreme views. In light of this lack of evi-
dence and worries I do not recommend classifying atypical responses as IER either (see Cur-
ran 2016 for a similar conclusion).29  
 
4.8 Open-Ended Questions 
As explained in Sec. 3.6, there is reason to believe that more and more surveys have recently 
been completed by bots. MTurkers have also been found to use virtual private servers that 
enable them to participate even if they are not qualified to do so (for example, because of their 
geographical location or language) or to provide duplicate responses (Dennis et al. 2018). 
There are various suggestions as to how to detect this most serious threat to the integrity of 
survey data. One of the most accurate and simple indicators appear to be open-ended ques-
tions. If responses are provided by a bot or an unqualified person the answers to these ques-
tions are often either irrelevant, non-sensical or pasted from online sources such as Wikipedia 
                                                 
29
 That said, outliers may of course be removed for non-IER reasons. 
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(see Dennis et al. 2018; Francis et al. 2018). Experimental philosophy studies might hence 
involve at least one open-ended question for the purposes of IER detection.30 This question 
need not be substantive. It can also be part of the instructions — as with the suggestion to 
have subjects type “I promise to carefully read each item and to provide an honest response” 
in a box (Sec. 3.7) — or part of gathering demographic data.  
5 Dealing with Insufficient Effort Responding (in 
Experimental Philosophy)  
Suppose a subject has been identified as an insufficient effort responder. What next? Unfortu-
nately, there are no established protocols for this case. In what follows I will therefore explain 
how experimental philosophers might deal with IER, given current preliminary recommenda-
tions in psychology and some reflections of my own. In particular, I will investigate whether 
IER subjects should be excluded from analysis, how such exclusions should be reported, and 
whether insufficient effort responders should be compensated for participating in surveys. 
 
5.1 Removing Data 
Should data from subjects who were identified as insufficient effort responders be excluded 
from analysis? When experimental philosophers run a survey, they attempt to get at subject’s 
intuitions about philosophical concepts. The responses of IER subjects mostly do not reflect 
these intuitions. In Sec. 1.2 I explained how this can have negative psychometric effects: at-
tenuating correlations, and in some cases also inflating them. Hence, there are strong reasons 
for excluding IER subjects from analysis.  
Excluding IER subjects from analysis has three downsides that need to be addressed. 
First, it increases researchers’ degrees of freedom. By varying the consideration, weight or 
thresholds of IER indicators they could engage in p-hacking or other questionable practices 
that allow them to achieve statistically significant effects. In light of this possibility I strongly 
encourage experimental philosophers to define objective and transparent exclusion rules prior 
to running their studies (see Curran 2016; Thomas and Clifford 2017). Compliance with this 
                                                 
30
 Going beyond IER detection, the inclusion of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy has recently 
been convincingly advocated by Andow (2016).  
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recommendation can and should be demonstrated by preregistering studies — including these 
rules — at dedicated websites such as aspredicted.org or osf.io.   
A second downside of excluding IER subjects is that it reduces sample size. This, in turn, 
reduces statistical power, i.e., the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis (Ward and 
Meade 2018; Ward and Pond 2015). In planning their studies experimental philosophers need 
to take this effect into consideration. In particular, they will often have to start out with larger 
samples than they used to: at least 10%, or better even 20% larger than with studies that did 
not exclude IER subjects. 
Finally, excluding subjects on the basis of IER indicators may introduce sampling bias, 
and thus limit generalizability (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2013; Meade and Craig 2012; Ward and 
Pond 2015).31 The evidence concerning this effect has been somewhat contradictory. It is pos-
sible that IER is correlated with traits such as having a low level of education (e.g., Zhang and 
Conrad), being male (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2013), being less intelligent (e.g., Holbrook et al. 
2007), and being young (e.g., Berinksy et al. 2013). To be able to detect such potential corre-
lations experimental philosophers might gather a number of demographic features of their 
samples. 
 
5.2 Reporting Results 
Even if one excludes only one single subject based on IER indicators, this must be clearly 
reported. Often such exclusions will not have any effect on one’s results. In this case a brief 
statement such as “The exclusion of insufficient effort responders that were identified based 
on [list indicators] did not have any significant effect on these results” suffices. If IER and 
non-IER subjects provided different responses, however, these differences must be explained 
in detail. Moreover, correlations between the IER subjects and demographic characteristics 
might be reported as well (Berinsky et al. 2013; Curran 2016; Desimone et al. 2015; Thomas 
and Clifford 2017). This could, for example, take the following form: 
 
The exclusion of insufficient effort responders that were identified based on [list indicators] 
did have a significant effect on these results. In particular, insufficient effort responders 
were more/less likely to [explain effect]. We found a significant correlation between insuffi-
                                                 
31
 To a lesser extent, this worry also applies to some of the IER prevention strategies discussed in Sec. 3. For 
example, choosing a less IER-prone sample or formulating instructions in certain ways might also lead to sam-
pling bias. 
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cient effort responders and [list demographic characteristics]. This means [explain potential 
implications for generalizability]. 
 
The requirement to report potential effects of excluding IER subjects has an important conse-
quence for the timing of this exclusion. Sometimes subjects are kicked out of a survey imme-
diately after failing on one or several indicators (such as attention or comprehension checks). 
In this case differences between IER and non-IER subjects in subsequent parts of the study 
cannot be investigated and reported. Given the above considerations, experimental philoso-
phers should rather have every subject complete their study, irrespectively of their perfor-
mance on IER indicators (Thomas and Clifford 2017).  
 
5.3 Compensating Subjects 
Anecdotal evidence as well as my below survey (see APPENDIX) suggest that most experi-
mental philosophers fully compensate subjects even if they were found to have engaged in 
IER. From each individual researcher’s perspective this practice may be rational. It spares 
them gaining special permissions for non-compensation from their universities’ Institutional 
Review Boards (where such permissions are required), as well as dealing with the potential 
angry backlash of subjects whom they refused compensation (and judging from what I expe-
rienced and heard, such a backlash is to be expected).  
However, if even the worst IER subjects are compensated this clearly threatens the integ-
rity of subject pools such as MTurk. Why should one take sufficient effort if one will receive 
compensation anyhow: rushing through the survey, always picking the same response, etc.? I 
hence recommend that, given conservative indicator thresholds, experimental philosophers do 
not — or at least not fully — compensate IER subjects.32 For ethical, legal and pragmatic rea-
sons this should be clearly stated at the beginning of the study. For example, after having dis-
closed the usage of attention and comprehension checks, one’s instructions may include a 
sentence like: “Poor performance on these attention and comprehension checks will result in 
you being disqualified from payment.” 
                                                 
32
 Another possible solution is to compensate all subjects at a low level, and provide additional compensation to 
sufficient effort responders (but not to insufficient effort responders). 
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Conclusion 
Insufficient effort responding has been considered a serious threat to the integrity of psycho-
logical self-report surveys. In this paper I first explained this phenomenon and argued that it is 
a potential problem for experimental philosophy as well. Drawing on current research in psy-
chology, I then developed guidelines for how (and how not) to address IER in experimental 
philosophy studies. These guidelines are rough and preliminary. At least, however, they may 
provide a helpful basis for further discussion. Here is a brief summary of the central recom-
mendations that emerged: 
 
Preventing IER 
 increase compensation in cross-cultural research (poor countries) 
 keep surveys short (but do not additionally shorten already short surveys, and do not 
sacrifice reliability/validity for shortness) 
 keep surveys simple (but do not additionally simplify already simple surveys, and do 
not sacrifice reliability/validity for simplicity) 
 use CAPTCHAs 
 in survey instructions appeal to subjects’ conscience (researchers’ work amount, par-
ticipation requirements, careful responding declaration) and promote meaningfulness 
(significance and gratitude) 
 
Detecting IER 
 use attention checks, and disclose this in survey instructions (instructional manipula-
tion checks, instructed-response items, bogus/infrequency items or stand-alone 
checks; keeping in mind the recommendations in Sec. 4.2) 
 use response time measures with absolute thresholds (or, under some circumstances, 
with statistical thresholds) 
 use comprehension checks, adjusted to the aims of studies 
 in longer studies use response pattern analyses (especially in the case of matrix ta-
bles; which should, however, if possible be avoided) 
 maybe use response consistency analysis; in particular, the analysis of identical con-
tent 
 include open-ended questions 
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 use several different (versions of) the above indicators, and those that suit the survey 
in question 
 for each indicator set conservative thresholds  
 
Dealing with IER 
 remove IER subjects from (at least part of) analyses 
 report exclusions, as well as results with IER subjects included (even if there is no 
difference) 
 preregister exclusion rules 
 start with somewhat larger samples 
 potentially report IER correlations with demographic characteristics 
 do not kick IER subjects out during the study 
 do not (fully) compensate IER subjects, and state this in the survey instructions 
 
Following recommendations such as these may be another important step in improving the 
methodology of experimental philosophy studies. In any case, I hope that this paper has raised 
awareness for the problem of insufficient effort responding and initiates further discussion. 
 
APPENDIX: A Survey of Experimental Philosophers 
In the main part of this paper I explained how experimental philosophers should proceed with 
regard to IER. This appendix addresses the question of how they have actually proceeded. 
What do they know about IER? How big of a problem do they think it is? To what extent and 
in what ways do they attempt to prevent, detect, and deal with it? To shed light on these ques-
tions I developed and conducted an online survey. 
 
Participants 
Invitations to participate in the survey were sent out to all persons whose studies were tested 
by the X-Phi Replicability project (Cova et al. 2018), all persons who gave presentations at 
the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conferences (2012 to 2018), all persons who gave 
presentations at the German Experimental Philosophy Group Workshops (2015 and 2017), all 
persons who gave presentations at the Meetings of the Spanish Experimental Philosophy As-
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sociation (2017 and 2018), and all persons who gave presentations at the last two conferences 
of the Experimental Philosophy Group UK (2017 and 2018). In total, 260 persons received 
invitations.33  
The survey was completed by 53 persons. This low response rate (20,39%) is mainly ex-
plained by the fact that I asked invitees to only take the survey if they have ever actively con-
tributed to an experimental philosophy study in the narrow sense assumed in this paper, i.e., a 
survey on lay persons’ views about a philosophical question. Many invitees did not meet this 
condition. They had only contributed to experimental philosophy studies in a broad sense or 
to theoretical work in experimental philosophy (as evinced both by their CVs and occasional 
response e-mails). 
Participants’ mean age was 40 years. 7 were full professors, 10 were associate professors, 
14 were assistant professors, 7 were postdocs, 3 were lecturers, 7 were PhD students, and 4 
identified as “other”. The majority’s primary affiliation was only with a philosophy depart-
ment (25 participants), only with a psychology department (10 participants) or with multiple 
departments (8 participants). 28 participants held a PhD in philosophy, 11 in psychology, and 
8 in other fields of the humanities or sciences. 14 participants listed MA or BA degrees in 
both philosophy and a science. Finally, many participants selected multiple experimental phi-
losophy subfields as their primary area of research, with the experimental philosophy of ethics 
(29 participants) being selected most often, followed by the experimental philosophy of action 
(11 participants) and the experimental philosophy of language and mind (10 participants 
each). 
The study was preregistered at aspredicted.org. To detect IER I measured response times, 
included several attention checks, and performed a scale straightlining analysis. Subjects were 
excluded if they completed the survey in less than 04:00 minutes, failed two or more attention 
checks or straightlined one or more survey pages. On the basis of these criteria one subject 
was excluded. This left a total of 52 participants for analysis. 
   
Methods 
At the beginning of the survey participants were informed about its purpose and received an 
explanation of IER (which was similar to the explanation provided in the first paragraph of 
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Sec. 1). Then they were asked questions pertaining to four categories: (1) preventing IER, (2) 
detecting IER, (3) dealing with IER, and (4) general questions.34  
 
Preventing Insufficient Effort Responding 
The part on preventing IER asked subjects how often they had used certain strategies for the 
specific purpose of preventing IER in studies that belong to experimental philosophy (in the 
sense of surveys on lay persons’ philosophical views). They were presented the following 
items (including brief explanations) which they could rate on a scale from “never” to “al-
ways”: 
 
(P1) using online crowdfunding samples 
(P2) using student samples 
(P3) sufficiently compensating subjects 
(P4) shortening surveys 
(P5) simplifying surveys 
(P6) having a physical proctor oversee the completion of a survey 
(P7) having a virtual proctor oversee the completion of a survey 
(P8) including CAPTCHAS  
(P9) explaining the survey’s purpose 
(P10) warning against negative consequences of IER 
(P11) having subjects sign or type a carefulness or honesty declaration 
(P12) introducing yourself and/or your expertise 
(P13) informing subjects that they will receive feedback about their responses 
(P14) thanking subjects 
(P15) explaining the survey’s significance 
 
 
Detecting Insufficient Effort Responding 
The part on detecting IER asked how often subjects had used strategies for the specific pur-
pose of detecting IER in studies that belong to experimental philosophy (in the sense of sur-
veys on lay persons’ philosophical views). Subjects were presented the following items, 
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 Some of these questions were taken or inspired by a survey that Liu et al. (2013) conducted among the mem-
bers of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. 
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which again included brief explanations, and again were supposed to be rated on a scale from 
“never” to “always”: 
 
(D1) instructional manipulation checks  
(D2) instructed-response  
(D3) bogus/infrequency items  
(D4) stand-alone checks  
(D5) absolute response time threshold  
(D6) statistical response time threshold  
(D7) comprehension checks 
(D8) self-reports on survey effort 
(D9) Scale Straightlining Analysis  
(D10) LongString Analysis  
(D11) response consistency analyses 
(D12) odd-even consistency  
(D13) psychometric consistency  
(D14) semantic consistency  
(D15) identical responses 
(D16) identification of atypical responses  
(D17) open-ended questions 
 
Dealing with Insufficient Effort Responding 
The part on dealing with IER asked subjects how they usually proceed if they detect IER. The 
items looked as follows, again including brief explanations, and again to be rated on a scale 
from “never” to “always”: 
 
(W1) I exclude IER subjects from (at least parts of) my analyses  
(W2) I define exclusion rules prior to running the survey 
(W3) I preregister my exclusion rules at dedicated websites such as aspredicted.org or 
osf.io (at least since very recently) 
(W4) In anticipation of IER I start with a larger sample size 
(W5) I report that I excluded IER subjects in my paper 
(W6) I report to what extent IER is correlated with demographic characteristics 
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(W7) I report what difference excluding IER subjects makes to the results  
(W8) I immediately kick subjects out of the survey when they fail on one or several IER 
indicators  
(W9) I fully compensate IER subjects 
 
General 
Finally, these were the survey’s general questions (verbatim): 
 
(G1) How many empirical studies in any area of research (not only experimental phi-
losophy) do you contribute to per year? 
(G2) How many experimental philosophy studies do you contribute to per year? 
(G3) For how many years have you contributed to conducting empirical studies in any 
area of research (not only experimental philosophy)? 
(G4) For how many years have you contributed to conducting experimental philosophy 
studies? 
(G5) To what extent do you think IER impacts the findings of your own experimental 
philosophy studies? 
(G6) To what extent do you think IER impacts the findings of experimental philosophy 
studies in general (not only your own studies)? 
(G7) In your estimate, what proportion of subjects in your experimental philosophy 
studies engage in IER throughout at least a quarter of the tasks that they com-
plete? 
(G8) In your estimate, what proportion of subjects in your experimental philosophy 
studies engage in IER throughout at least half of the tasks that they complete? 
(G9) Compared to survey research in other disciplines, do you think that IER is a big-
ger or smaller problem in experimental philosophy? 
(G10) Which of the following practices have you been familiar with before you were in-
vited to participate in this survey (whether or not you have ever used them)? [list 
of IER prevention strategies]  
(G11) Which of the following practices have you been familiar with before you were in-
vited to participate in this survey (whether or not you have ever used them)? [list 
of IER detection strategies] 
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(G12) Before you were invited to participate in this study, could you have explained the 
difference between an instructional manipulation check, and instructed-response 
item and a bogus/infrequency item (three kinds of attention checks). 
(G13) How many scholarly articles that primarily address IER (e.g., how to detect or re-
spond to it) have you read so far? 
(G14) How often have you explicitly discussed IER (e.g., how to detect or respond to it) 
with your colleagues so far? 
(G15) How much has your knowledge and consideration of IER increased over your ca-
reer as an empirical researcher? 
(G16) How much do you think experimental philosophy would benefit from researchers 
becoming more knowledgable about IER? 
(G17) Do you think you have sufficiently addressed IER in your experimental philoso-
phy research (in terms of preventing, detecting and dealing with it)? 
 
Both the order of the first three categories (preventing/detecting/dealing with) and the order of 
all individual items were randomized. At the end of each survey page subjects could provide 
comments on the questions and the answers that they had given to them. To test a number of 
hypotheses about what predicts IER attitudes (see next section) I created five scales. These 
scales reflect subjects’ experience in conducting (experimental philosophy) studies (G1-G4), 
their knowledge of IER (G10-G14), their estimates of IER’s effect on experimental philoso-
phy studies (G5-G9, G16, G17), their usage of IER prevention strategies (P1-P15), their usage 
of IER detection strategies (D1-D17), and their usage of the most appropriate IER prevention 
and detection strategies (P4, P5, P8, P9, P11, P14, P15, D1-D7, D9, D10, D15, D17). 
 
Results 
The following three charts present how the survey’s participants have so far attempted to pre-
vent, detect, and deal with IER in their experimental philosophy studies. 
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Figure 1: Usage of IER prevention strategies in experimental philosophy studies: 0 = 
Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = About half the time, 3 = Most of the time, 4 = Always  
 
Figure 2: Usage of IER detection strategies in experimental philosophy studies: 0 = 
Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = About half the time, 3 = Most of the time, 4 = Always  
0 1 2 3 4
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Figure 3: Dealing with IER in experimental philosophy studies: 0 = Never, 1 = Some-
times, 2 = About half the time, 3 = Most of the time, 4 = Always35  
Experience in conducting (experimental philosophy) studies 
Participants stated that they contribute to 2.67 empirical studies a year, most of which (2.13) 
are experimental philosophy studies. They have been engaged in empirical research for 2.85 
years, and in experimental philosophy research for 2,54 years. In their perception, their 
knowledge and consideration of IER has “moderately” increased over their career as a re-
searcher.  
 
Knowledge of IER 
All participants indicated that they have been familiar with at least some IER prevention and 
some IER detection strategies prior to completing the survey; most notably, with thanking 
subjects and explaining surveys’ significance and purpose (regarding prevention), and with 
comprehension checks, attention checks and response time measures (regarding detection). 
They also stated that they have explicitly discussed IER with their colleagues several times 
(M = 3.44), and have read some scholarly articles that address it (M = 2.02). 
 
Effects of IER 
In the participants’ view, IER only “somewhat” or “lowly” impacts the findings of their own 
and others’ experimental philosophy studies — to the same extent to which it impacts self-
report surveys in other areas of research. They believe that they “might” or “probably” have 
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 At first sight it may seem paradoxical that participants declared to more often report the exclusion of IER 
subjects than to actually exclude such subjects. A plausible explanation of this result is that the reporting item 
was read in a conditional sense: If I exclude IER then I report this exclusion.   
0 1 2 3 4
I report correlation IER and demographics
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I preregister exclusion rules
I report difference IER - non-IER subjects
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I define exclusion rules prior to running survey
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I report that I excluded IER subjects
 35 
 
sufficiently addressed IER in their own studies. At the same time, however, participants also 
estimated that 21.71% of subjects in their experimental philosophy studies engage in IER 
throughout at least a quarter of the tasks that they complete, and 15.53% throughout at least 
half of these tasks; and they stated that experimental philosophy would benefit “moderately” 
to “a lot” from researchers becoming more knowledgeable about IER. 
 
Prior to conducting the survey I formulated several hypotheses about what predicts experi-
mental philosophers’ knowledge, usage, proper usage, and effect estimates regarding IER. 
Most importantly, I was interested in the impact of affiliation and academic training.  
It turned out that experimental philosophers with a primary or secondary affiliation in 
psychology, cognitive science or some other science had more knowledge about IER (t(50) = 
-2.807, p = 0.007), used IER prevention and detection strategies more often (t(50) = -1.710, p 
= 0.094), and rated IER’s impact on experimental philosophy studies to be lower than exper-
imental philosophers who are only affiliated with philosophy or other humanities departments 
(t(50) = 1.916, p = 0.061). Experimental philosophers also tended to have more knowledge 
about IER if they held a BA, MA or PhD in psychology, cognitive science or some other sci-
ence (t(50) = -2.657, p = 0.011).  
 
  
Know-
ledge M 
(SD) 
Usage M 
(SD) 
Proper 
Usage M 
(SD) 
Est. Effect 
M (SD) 
Psychology, Cognitive Science or other Science Affiliation/s 
4,77** 
(1,30) 
2,21* 
(0,38) 
2,67 
(0,51) 
2,51* 
(0,34) 
Only Philosophy or other Humanities Affiliation/s 
3,72 
(1,41) 
2,03 
(0,39) 
2,43 
(0,57) 
2,67 
(0,25) 
Psychology, Cognitive Science or other Science Degree/s 
4,69** 
(1,45) 
2,13 
(0,44) 
2,58 
(0,57) 
2,55 
(0,34) 
Only Philosophy or other Humanities Degree/s 
3,68 
(1,25) 
1,11 
(0,32) 
2,52 
(0,54) 
2,65 
(0,25) 
 
Table 2: Effect of being affiliated with a psychology, cognitive science or other science de-
partment (primarily or secondarily) and of having a degree in any of these fields (BA, MA or 
PhD) on experimental philosophers’ knowledge about IER, their usage of IER prevention and 
detection strategies, their proper usage of these strategies, and their estimates of IER’s effect 
on experimental philosophy studies. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
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Interestingly, and to be further discussed below, by themselves neither affiliation nor academ-
ic training predicted whether an experimental philosopher properly addresses IER (in the way 
suggested in this paper’s main part). The variable that correlated most strongly with proper 
usage was knowledge about IER as such, as measured in terms of the prevention and detec-
tion strategies that an experimental philosopher is familiar with, the number of articles that he 
or she has read about it, and the number of discussions that he or she has had about it (r = 
0.643, p = 0.000). Proper usage also correlated with research experience, albeit more weakly 
(r = 0.337, p = 0.015). 
Finally, the exclusion of the survey’s insufficient effort responder (as detected by re-
sponse time measures, attention checks, and scale straightlining analysis) did not have any 
notable effect on the results of the above analyses, except slightly decreasing power.36 
 
Discussion 
As explained in the paper’s main part, research suggests that IER can be a serious threat to 
self-report surveys’ validity and reliability (e.g., Curran 2016; Huang et al. 2012, 2015; 
Meade and Craig 2012). Experimental philosophers appear to be somewhat aware of this 
threat. They have some knowledge about IER, they believe that it has at least some impact on 
their studies’ results, and they sometimes use some strategies for preventing and detecting it. 
That said, the survey also suggests that IER’s effects might still be somewhat underestimated 
by or unclear to experimental philosophers (especially given their divergent and sometimes 
intrapersonally inconsistent explicit estimates); and just like researchers in other areas, they 
have not always addressed it in the most appropriate ways.  
As to the prevention of IER, experimental philosophers often use some of the strategies 
that were recommended in Sec. 3. Two such strategies, however, have so far widely been ne-
glected. Experimental philosophers have only rarely included carefulness/honesty declara-
tions and CAPTCHAs into their surveys. This is particularly noteworthy in the case of CAP-
TCHAs, as they are a very simple and effective tool to prevent some of the worst IER, namely 
responses from bots. Finally, the results of the survey’s prevention part also reflect a common 
misunderstanding about the relative effort exerted by different kinds of subjects. Experimental 
philosophers have most often attempted to prevent IER by using student samples — even 
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 All significant effects also turned out to be significant with the IER subject included, with very similar levels 
of significance, effect sizes and correlation coefficients. No additional effects crossed the threshold of signifi-
cance. 
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though, as argued in Sec. 3.1, students are no less and perhaps even more prone to such be-
havior than subjects from crowdsourcing platforms.   
The list of experimental philosophers’ most-used IER detection practices is topped by 
comprehension checks, response time measures and attention checks. If implemented properly 
these strategies are indeed reliable and effective. Differing from my recommendations, exper-
imental philosophers have so far hardly drawn on presenting subjects identical questions or 
items; and they have rarely used (and mostly are not even familiar with) post-hoc analyses 
such as LongString Analysis and Scale Straightlining. The latter is in stark contrast to how 
psychologists attempt to detect IER. For example, in a similar survey the members of the So-
ciety for Industrial and Organizational Psychology have stated that they use post-hoc anal-
yses more regularly than any other IER detection strategy (Bowling et al. 2013).37 
If a subject turns out to have engaged in IER experimental philosophers typically exclude 
this subject from (some) analyses and report such exclusions in their paper — but not always. 
This result is puzzling. Why would a researcher take the effort of detecting IER subjects but 
then include them in all analyses? The only plausible answer that I can think of is that such 
decisions are made when the prevalence of IER is found to be very low. In any case, it would 
be good for experimental philosophers to always exclude IER subjects and to always report 
these exclusions, as well as to preregister their exclusion rules. To preserve the integrity of 
subject pools like MTurk the practice of fully compensating IER subjects (employed “most of 
the time”) should be rethought too.   
The (perhaps obvious) main result of my statistical analysis is that the more experimental 
philosophers know about IER the more likely they are to properly address it in their studies. 
This knowledge sometimes arises from a degree in psychology, cognitive science or some 
other science. Thus, if controlled for knowledge, such degrees turn out to predict that an ex-
perimental philosopher uses the most recommendable IER prevention and detection strate-
gies, and deals with IER subjects in the most appropriate ways (B = 0.271, p = 0.09; when 
knowledge is entered as a covariate in an ANOVA degree predicts proper usage too). But 
knowledge about IER can of course be acquired in different ways too (such as by reading or 
having discussions about it). In line with this article’s motivation, it is therefore important to 
make experimental philosophers more aware of and encourage them to learn about IER. 
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 Very likely, this difference is at least partly explained by the fact that industrial and organizational psycholo-
gists use long lists of items (which are prone to patterned responses), while experimental philosophers typically 
present their subjects with a small number of more detailed cases. 
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The results of this survey must be taken with a grain of salt. Its sample size is small. 
Moreover, it presupposes that participants correctly recalled, synthesized and reported infor-
mation about a number of studies and other events that may date back years. Hopefully, how-
ever, the survey nevertheless provided a first rough glimpse into experimental philosophers’ 
knowledge, consideration and assessment of IER. 
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